### Background material 5

**Armed conflicts and the influence of Islam in post-socialist countries***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Present name of country</th>
<th>Bertelsmann BTI: status index (S, SI, SII), influence of religious dogmas (Q1.3)**</th>
<th>Freedom House NiT***</th>
<th>UN HDI***</th>
<th>War in 2013-2016?</th>
<th>Is Islam the main religion? (Muslim %)</th>
<th>If yes, does the church interfere with the market?</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>S: 4.16 SI: moderate autocracy, SII: poorly functioning Q1.3: 9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no (0.5%, 5%, 1%)</td>
<td>No: Muslim proportion is low; Islam may be oppressed</td>
<td>Pew (2009: 30), Cabeche-Smith (2013), Yashar (2013), Bertlesmann (2016 a, c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>S: 3.55 SI: hard-line autocracy, SII: poorly functioning Q1.3: 6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no (34%)</td>
<td>No: Muslims are in minority, the influence of dogmas is moderate</td>
<td>CIA (2016f), Pew (2009, 2012, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Present name of country</td>
<td>Bertelsmann BTI: status index (S, SI, SII), influence of religious dogmas (Q1.3)</td>
<td>Freedom House NiT³</td>
<td>UN HDI⁴</td>
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<td>Is Islam the main religion? (Muslim %)</td>
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<td>Sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>S: 3.39; SI: hard-line autocracy, SII: poorly functioning Q1.3: 3</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>yes (89%, 87%, 93%)</td>
<td>Controversial picture: some sources claim religious influence is more than intermediate, a hybrid system is at work, others claim the state persecutes Islam selectively</td>
<td>CIA (2016q), Pryor (2007:1817), Pew (2009, 2012), Hiro (2009), Guardian (2016c), Recknagel-Tahir (2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes
5 Background material 5 was collected by Andrea Reményi.
1 Numbering follows that of Background material 2. The table shows only countries with a considerable Muslim population.
2 The Bertelsmann (2016a) Transition Index (BTI) overall value (S = status index, between 1-10 points), the mean of the democracy status (SI) and the market economy status (SII) values.
The index of the influence of religious dogmas (Q1.3) (Bertelsmann 2016c: 17):
10 -- The state is secular. Religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on legal order or political institutions.
7 -- The state is largely secular. However, religious dogmas have considerable influence on legal order and political institutions.
4 -- Secular and religious norms are in conflict about the basic constitution of the state or are forming a hybrid system.
1 -- The state is theocratic. Religious dogmas define legal order and political institutions.
below 3 – consolidated democracy
3-4 – semi-consolidated democracy
4-5 – transitional government or hybrid regime
5-6 – semi-consolidated authoritarian regime
above 6 – consolidated authoritarian regime
4 The UN (2015) Human Development Index (HDI) categories:
0.8-1.00 – very high human development
0.7-0.8 – high human development
0.55-0.7 – medium human development
Below 0.55 – low human development

A few relevant background analyses
The Pew Research Center, located in Washington DC, regularly publishes analyses about religious life worldwide (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life). The latest global demographic overview about the distribution of Islam was published in 2009. Between 2008 and 2012 they conducted 38,000 interviews (!) in 39 countries, which were the basis of several publications, among them the following two.
The analysis published in 2012 discusses specificities and religious practices of Muslims’ faith (Pew 2012). For example, in the countries listed in this text following Islam, 91 per cent pay the yearly zakat (religious donation; see an explanation below, at the summary on Pryor 2007) in Afghanistan; this figure is 43 in Albania, 59 in Azerbaijan, 81 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 82 in Ethiopia, 77 in Kyrgyzstan, 69 in Kosovo, 66 in Tajikistan, and 73 in Uzbekistan (Pew 2012: 52).
A substantial analysis (226 pages) published in 2013 reviews Islam’s relationship with politics and society, including a full chapter on the sariah (Islamic law). It has a focus on the issue what proportion of the population (would) support the introduction of the sariah as the official law (pp. 15, 46-48). As far as the countries examined here are concerned, among those following Islam 99 percent would support the introduction of the sariah as the official law in Afghanistan; this figure is 12 in Albania, 8 in Azerbaijan, 15 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 65 in Ethiopia, 35 in Kyrgyzstan, 20 in Kosovo 27 in Tajikistan.
Among the Muslims in Albania 11, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 6, in Ethiopia 65, in Kyrgyzstan 44, in Kosovo 10, in Tajikistan 33 per cent would support the introduction of Islamic
laws of court judging in family law cases. In Afghanistan, where Islamic courts actually judge in those cases, the proportion of supporters is 78 per cent (Pew 2013: 79).

To the question whether they support democracy vs. a strong leader, Muslim participants answered in the following proportions: in Afghanistan 45 vs. 51, in Albania 69 vs. 25, in Azerbaijan 51 vs. 42, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 47 vs. 51, in Ethiopia 72 vs. 26, in Kyrgyzstan 32 vs. 64, in Kosovo 76 vs. 13, and in Tajikistan 76 vs. 20 per cent (Pew 2013: 60).

To the question whether religious leaders should have considerable or some political influence, 82 per cent in Afghanistan, 15 in Albania, 14 in Azerbaijan, 17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 46 in Kyrgyzstan, 27 in Kosovo, and 28 in Tajikistan answered yes. (This question was not asked in the sub-Saharan countries; Pew: 2013:64.)

The proportion of Muslims supporting the question if suicide bombing can often or sometimes be justified may be a valid indicator to openness to political extremism: their proportion in Afghanistan is 39, in Albania 6, in Azerbaijan 1, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 3, in Kyrgyzstan 10, in Kosovo 11, in Tajikistan 3 per cent. (This question was not asked in Ethiopia; Pew 2013: 70).

Pryor (2007)
Pryor (2007) offers a general overview about the influence of Islam on the economy in Muslim countries. He analyses 44 economic institutions (12 product market, six labour market, ten enterprise, six finance and ten government institutions; 2007: 1833-1834) with cluster analysis and regression analysis. He concludes that there is no specific Muslim economic system, moreover, there are only a few specific Muslim economic institutions. Little influence of Islam’s presence can be confirmed on most economic and social indicators. The topics related to economic practice in the Quran are discussed there too generally to offer the possibility for testable assumptions (similarly to such a relationship between the New Testament and the economies of major Christian countries; Pryor 2007: 1816). The schools of Muslim jurisprudence often disagree on the interpretations of the Quran.

An important example Pryor discusses (2007: 1818) is the Muslim doctrine of the prohibition of collecting interest (riba). In contradiction, some countries (e.g., Iran) allow advance payments on bank accounts for future profits which correspond to the interest rate. Mark-up loans (murabaha) are even more frequent: first the bank purchases the goods requested by the client, and then sells it to him at a higher price to be repaid in instalments in a future time interval. Several Muslim governments pay interest also on government bonds and postal savings. Pryor adds (2007: 1818) that, on top of that, in Muslim countries only 17 per cent of savings are kept in Muslim banks.

Another important economic doctrine is the religious charity practice in the form of yearly donations (zakat/zakah): in some countries it is obligatory, collected as a tax. Inheritance has also to be distributed among many relatives (Pryor 2007: 1819).

Based on the cluster analysis, the countries studied in the present text are classified by Pryor (2007: 1822) according to their economic systems in the following categories:

-- traditional Muslim government: Ethiopia
-- market encouraging government: Albania
-- high indirect government role: Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.

As far as performance systems are concerned, the cluster analysis finds the following groups and the following countries in them (Pryor 2007: 1825):

-- relatively low growth, relatively high inflation: Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan
-- relatively high education and health oriented: Uzbekistan
-- relatively low education and health oriented: Ethiopia.

On the basis of the above analysis Pryor draws the conclusion that Muslim countries are impossible to delineate on the basis of the above wide-ranging economic indicators.
Platteau (2008)
In another principal paper Platteau (2008: 329) also asks the question related to Islamic countries: can religion hinder economic development and institutional change? He reviews several papers and points out that, while the null hypothesis can often be rejected that religious affiliation is unrelated to economic performance (2008: 329), it turns out impossible to quantitatively relate the relationship between that performance and religion. (Here he points out the logical and factual errors in Weber’s protestant ethic theory as well, 2008: 330-331.) The paper refutes Bernard Lewis’ famous thesis (What went wrong? 2002), i.e., the democracy deficit in Muslim countries is caused by the lack of separation between religion and politics, partly on the basis of the following. Though politics and religion merge in these countries, firstly, “religion is the handmaiden rather than the master of politics;” secondly, the influence of religion increases in crisis situations; thirdly, political leaders under attack turn to an Islamic frame of reference as an easy solution rather than a more difficult institutional reform; and finally, the legacy of Islam as an institutional trap makes reforms more difficult (Platteau 2008: 329).

Rougier (2016)
In a recent analysis Rougier (2016) proves that the protests of the “Arab Springs” were caused by the disappointing social-economic situation, which is a consequence of the social contract based on authoritative and large scale redistribution practised since those countries' independence (cf. the charity practice taken over by the state, described by Pryor 2008 above; and the doctrine of waqf described by Kuran 2004 below). Rougier shows that those two phenomena are themselves responsible for weakening the reform readiness in those countries, but their combination have determined the situation (2016: 148). He stresses: „To date, however, no study has empirically tested the cumulative impact of the combination of high redistribution and strong authoritarianism on economic transformation.” (2016:149).

Kuran (2004)
In this often quoted paper by Kuran (2004) explains the slow development of Islamic states the following way: 1. Islamic inheritance law makes capital accumulation impossible; 2. the concept of corporation is absent in Islamic law, therefore civil society is weak; 3. the waqf (religious donation) has used up enormous resources, and instead of creating assets turned them into socially-based redistribution. Although these economic phenomena have lost their importance since the 19th century, traditional Islamic law is further contributing to the disappointing economic performance of the Middle East.

Bertelsmann (2016b)
The 12-page executive summary emphasises the increasing importance of religion in the world. Its most emphatic, number 1, points claims (2016b: 2-3; see also Figure 1 below):

On the BTT’s ten-point scale, the intensity of social, ethnic and religious conflicts has increased in the past 10 years by more than half a point on a global-average basis. Social conflicts increasingly play out along religious cleavages. These conflicts are exacerbated by militant and extremist organizations that – from Boko Haram and al-Qaeda to the Islamic State and the Taliban – primarily follow a violent jihadist ideology. The influence of religious dogmas on the internal functioning of political systems has once again increased, after the clear negative trends highlighted in the BTT 2014. In 21 states, legal systems and political institutions were more strongly subject to this influence than was the case two years ago, with reductions evident in only five countries. The influence of Islamism has again increased in the Arab states of Iraq, Libya and Syria, but in Turkey too the government is pursuing a more strongly Islamist agenda than in the past. This stronger religious charge within the political sphere is neither solely limited to the Arab world, nor to majority-Muslim societies. However, there are clear regional focal points. The 42 countries in which religion currently
has at least a perceptible influence on politics are either Arab, African or Asian. Considering the longer time period since the BTI 2006, the interference of religious dogmas on legal order and political institutions has shown the largest increase over the last decade; indeed, this is the most strongly pronounced negative trend within all 18 indicators in the dimension of political transformation.

![Figure 1. Change in the influence of religious dogmas between 2006 and 2016, according to Bertelsmann’s transformation index report (2016b: 3)](image)

Considerable negative change between 2006-2016:
-4 point: Ethiopia, Libya
-3 point: Yemen, Eritrea, Senegal, Syria (Bertelsmann 2016b: 3)

### Country analyses (the numbering follows that of the table above)

1. Afghanistan
   According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Afghanistan is a hard-line autocracy. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the influence of Islam is stronger than moderate: a hybrid system is at work. (Afghanistan is not included in the Freedom House (2016) analysis.)

   Islam is the official religion (Pew 2013: 18). Islamic identification is also represented in the official name of the country: “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” 98 (CIA 2016a) to 99.7 per cent (Pew 2009: 28) of the population is Muslim. Yearly religious donation (zakat) is paid by 91 per cent (Pew 2012:52). 99 per cent support the application of *saria* as the official law (Pew 2013: 15), 78 per cent support the jurisdiction of Islamic courts in family law (Pew 2013: 19). 51 per cent prefer a strong leader vs. 45 per cent prefer democracy (Pew 2013: 60). The political influence of religious leaders is supported by 82 per cent (Pew 2013: 64). 39 per cent find suicide bombing sometimes or often justifiable (Pew 2013: 70).

   The first peaceful transfer of leadership in 2014 (president: Karzai, followed by Ghani) can be considered a democratic sign, according to the classification in Kornai’s paper.

   Bertelsmann (2016b: 2) claims that the elections in 2014 and the corresponding withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces indicated the end of the transition period. The first democratic takeover of governmental power ended Karzai’s rule (who was not eligible to run again in 2014).
After the elections a unity government was formed, including Ghani as the president and Abdullah in the newly created post of the prime minister (“chief executive”). The new parliament (grand assembly, Loya Jirga) is to be convened in September 2016. Following international pressure, and in accordance with the Tokyo Agreement, further democratic reforms and a market economy are to be pursued by the new political powers. Today the country is sovereign in terms of its military but, due to the insurgency, the number of civilian casualties is increasing, and over half a million people are internally displaced. Human rights abuses and discrimination continue. Though the country’s economic situation is improving, capital, jobs and strategic planning are scarce, while poverty rates are high and not decreasing (2016b: 2).

As far as the influence of Islam is concerned, Bertelsmann (2016b: 2) points out that “the legal order and official justice system also follow Islamic principles. Free expressions of opinions that violate or question Islamic norms are largely perceived as a threat to Islam and are rejected, as is the freedom of expression. Given the slow development of the legal system, the delivery of justice and civil conflict mediation are in practice dominated by traditional actors such as local mullahs, elders, traditional elites, Taliban and their local shadow institutions. […] Non-state justice delivery enjoys legitimacy because it is faster and cheaper and enforcement is more likely.”

Sieff & Partlow (2014) confirm that the budget deficit in Afghanistan is very high (20%). Several UN institutions are present, among them UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) is the most important. The UN News Centre (2015) stresses that, in spite of the development, the country faces grave economic, political and security challenges in 2016. UNAMA continues negotiations with Taliban.

Pew (2013: 19) confirms that in family law cases religious courts practise jurisdiction in Afghanistan.

Byrd (2016: 9) suggests, as a way to invigorate the Afghan economy, sukuk (Muslim government bonds) should be issued to counterbalance the budget deficit. The sukuk is a government bond compatible with sariah, acceptable also according to the Bahrein-based Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (Wikipedia/AAOIFI (2016).

2. Albania

According to Bertelsmann (2016a) Albania is a defective democracy, according to Freedom House (2016) it is a hybrid regime. According to Pryor, it has a market encouraging government (2007: 1822). Bertelsmann (2016c) claims Islam does not have an influence over the state.

The data about the proportion of Muslim seem uncertain: they are 39 (Pryor 2007:1818, 1822), 57 (CIA 2016b), 80 per cent (Pew 2009) of the population – thus, Albania is the only European country with a possible Muslim majority (Kosovo has a higher proportion, but its state status is disputed). 43 per cent pay a yearly religious donation (zakat) (Pew 2012:52). 12 per cent would support the application of sariah as the official law (Pew 2013: 15), 11 per cent would support Islamic jurisdiction in family law (Pew 2013: 19). 25 per cent prefer a strong leader, 69 per cent democracy (Pew 2013: 60). 15 per cent support the political influence of religious leaders (Pew 2013: 64). Six per cent find suicide bombings often or sometimes justifiable (Pew 2013: 70).

According to Tanner (2015), Muslims in Albania consider themselves „Muslim-lite” (that is, their Muslim religion is not deeply rooted in their faith and practices). Some radicalisation is present in the country but it has minimal influence.

3. Angola

According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Angola is a moderate autocracy. The proportion of Muslims is very low: 0.5 (Cabeche-Smith 2013) to 1 per cent (Pew 2009: 30). The recent Pew
publications (2012, 2013) do not discuss Angola. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the state is mostly secular, and religious dogmas have little influence on the legal order and political institutions.

In 2013 several mosques were closed (Cabeche-Smith 2013); according to Yashar (2013), Angola can be the first country “to ban Islam” – official sources deny that.

5. Azerbaijan
According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Azerbaijan is a hard-line autocracy. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the state is largely secular, but religious dogmas have some influence on the legal order or political institutions. According to Freedom House (2016b: 2), it is a consolidated authoritarian regime, and in 2015 it took aggressive steps to stop critical and dissident voices while the economic crisis has been deepening, due to the oil price decrease.

The proportion of Muslims is large, 84 to 99 per cent: 84 (Pryor, 2007: 1817), 94 (Valiyev, 2005: 1), 97 (CIA, 2016c) 99 per cent (Pew, 2009:28). Most of them are followers of Shia Islam but the Sunni branch is also present, while recently the Salafi movement has been spreading.¹

A yearly religious donation (zakat) is paid by 59 per cent (Pew 2012:52), 8 per cent would support the application of saria as the official law (Pew 2013: 15), 8 per cent would support the jurisdiction of Islamic courts in family law (Pew 2013: 19). 42 per cent prefer a strong leader vs. 51 per cent prefer democracy (Pew 2013: 60). The political influence of religious leaders is supported by 14 per cent (Pew 2013: 64). One per cent find suicide bombing sometimes or often justifiable (Pew 2013: 70).

Valiyev (2005) describes the situation in detail: the country became independent in 1991, triggering a religious revival, though it was superficial (2005: 2). Aliyev Senior grabbed the power in 1993 with a coup d’etat, and was supported by religious leaders in solidifying his power. He took the presidential oath on the constitution and the Quran. The supreme clergy, in return, gives their blessings and creates propaganda to show that government steps comply with Islamic norms (2005: 6). Some mosques display the head of state’s portrait! (2005: 6) The state seems to have integrated and subordinated Islam into its system. A majority of the population consider Islam rather a tradition than a religion (2005: 12).

Presently, however, the influence of radical Islamist organisations is growing. The most influential factor is Iran, the southern neighbour (Hezbollah, etc.). Besides, the Islamist impact from Turkey and the influence of Salafi Islamists at home are strong (Valiyev 2005: 8). Valiyev emphasises that the situation is similar to the one in the 1970s Iran [or several Arabic countries before 2011]: dissatisfaction with the political system and the worsening economic situation (poverty, increasing inequality, the large number of refugees from Armenia and Karabakh, which is part of Azerbaijan) turn the population toward the strengthened Islamists (2005: 12).

The more recent article by Souleimanov & Ehrmann describes the rise of Salafi Islam and followers’ militarisation (turning to jihad) (2013: 1). In 2012 Azeri police struck on Salafi/jihadist cells in northern Azerbaijan, in Baku and elsewhere. They point out that Azerbaijan is “sandwiched” between Iran, from the south, and Dagestan’s Islamist-laden insurgency from the north (2013: 1). They state that, although Azerbaijan is a secular country, economic-political dissatisfaction shifts it towards Islamisation.

8. Bosnia and Herzegovina
According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Bosnia and Herzegovina is a defective democracy. According to Freedom House (2016), it is a hybrid regime. According to Bertelsmann (2016c),

¹ The Salafi movement (roughly the same as Wahabbism) is an ultra-conservative and puritanical reform movement within Islam. Broadly speaking, jihadists belong to the military part of that movement (Jihad “holy war”). Mujahid/mujahidin is another word for jihadist.
the state is largely secular, however, religious dogmas have some influence on legal order or political institutions.

The proportion of Muslims is medium: 40 (CIA 2016e, Pew 2009:31) to 60 per cent (Pryor 2007: 1817). A yearly religious donation (zakat) is paid by 81 per cent (Pew 2012:52), 15 per cent would support the application of saria as the official law (Pew 2013: 15), 6 per cent would support the jurisdiction of Islamic courts in family law (Pew 2013: 19). 51 per cent prefer a strong leader vs. 47 per cent prefer democracy (Pew 2013: 60). The political influence of religious leaders is supported by 17 per cent (Pew 2013: 64). Three per cent find suicide bombing sometimes or often justifiable (Pew 2013: 70).

According to Babic, Bosnian nationalism strengthening in the Bosnia Muslim community in the 1990s was an answer to the Serbian and Croatian nationalism, that is, the strengthened religious belief supported nationalist separation ("islamism as nationalism," 2014: 135). The end of Yugoslavia caused a vacuum, which paved a way to external influences. Babic separates a pre- and post-2001 period in his analysis. Before 2001 Salafi Islamists became stronger in the region, partly due to the support from Islamic states (e.g., Saudi Arabia), and the presence of mujahidin fighters and Muslim missionaries (2014: 133-134). Those ceased to continue after 2001, several Islamic organisations were banned and some local one were accused of terrorism (2014: 134). Presently, the country suffers from corruption, organised crime and ethnic conflicts, Bosnia and the Balkan as a whole is unlikely to be the refuge or financial source of terrorists (2014: 135).

Freedom House (2016c) paints a dark picture of the present political system in the country: „With progress practically nonexistent, the overall state of democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is declining year after year. Politicians fail to respect the will of citizens, who are at the same time unable to hold leaders accountable for their actions.” (2016c: 2)

16. Ethiopia

According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Ethiopia is a hard-line autocracy. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the state is partly secular, and religious dogmas have some impact on the legal system and political institutions. (The country is not included in the analysis of Freedom House (2016).)

The proportion of Muslims is 34 per cent (Pew 2009:30). A yearly religious donation (zakat) is paid by 82 per cent (Pew 2012:52), 65 per cent would support the application of saria as the official law (Pew 2013: 15), 65 per cent would support the jurisdiction of Islamic courts in family law (Pew 2013: 19). 26 per cent prefer a strong leader vs. 72 per cent prefer democracy (Pew 2013: 60).

21. Kosovo (disputed status)

According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Kosovo is a defective democracy. According to Freedom House (2016), it is a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the state is mostly secular, and religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on the legal order or political institutions.

The proportion of Muslims is large: 90 (Pew 2009:31) to 96 per cent (CIA 2016j). A yearly religious donation (zakat) is paid by 69 per cent (Pew 2012:52), 20 per cent would support the application of saria as the official law (Pew 2013: 15), 10 per cent would support the jurisdiction of Islamic courts in family law (Pew 2013: 19). 13 per cent prefer a strong leader vs. 76 per cent prefer democracy (Pew 2013: 60). The political influence of religious leaders is supported by 27 per cent (Pew 2013: 64). 11 per cent find suicide bombing sometimes or often justifiable (Pew 2013: 70).

According to Call (2016), ISIS finds fertile soil in Kosovo. A Muslim country, which was earlier tolerant and one of the most pro-America Muslim countries in the world, now has become the breeding ground of Islam extremists, offering mass support for jihadists. Plenty of financial
support has arrived from the Middle East: Call (2016) describes an example where one million US dollars arrived at a foundation to build a mosque – this and 12 others have been closed by Kosovo police, also arresting 40 people.

22. Kyrgyzstan
According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Kyrgyzstan is a highly defective democracy. According to Freedom House (2016), it is a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the state is mostly secular, and religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on the legal order or political institutions.

Muslims are in the majority in Kyrgyzstan: 60 (Pryor 2007:1817) to 75 (CIA 2016i) to 86 per cent (Pew 2009: 28). A yearly religious donation (zakat) is paid by 77 per cent (Pew 2012:52), 35 per cent would support the application of saria as the official law (Pew 2013: 15), 44 per cent would support the jurisdiction of Islamic courts in family law (Pew 2013: 19). 64 per cent prefer a strong leader vs. 32 per cent prefer democracy (Pew 2013: 60). The political influence of religious leaders is supported by 46 per cent (Pew 2013: 64). Ten per cent find suicide bombing sometimes or often justifiable (Pew 2013: 70).

According to North (2016), a turn towards the West was characteristic of Kyrgyzstan between 1991-2011, for example, Akayev in 2001 opened the airbase near the capital, Biskek, for American troops being ferried to and from Afghanistan. Atambayev, in power since 2011, has been tilted towards Russia.

Muslims are mostly Sunnites. After 1991 the proportion of Muslims grew partly because Soviet state persecution ceased, partly because one hundred thousand Russians (of the about six million Kyrgyz population) left as the country became independent (Hiro 2009: 287). Galdini (2015) reports that since the end of the 1980s an Islam revival has been happening. Since 2010 the growth of Islamist influence cannot be excluded. On the other hand, the background of clashes between special state forces and militant radicals in Biskek in 2015 seems suspicious. Radicalisation and ISIS contacts may be related to a few groups only, and Islamist mobilisation may rather be used by the state to evoke the illusion of a threat (Pikulicka & Wilczewska 2015).

40. Somalia
According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Somalia is a hard-line autocracy. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the state is mostly secular, and religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on the legal order or political institutions. (The country is not included in the analysis of Freedom House (2016).)

The country is overwhelmingly Muslim: 88.5 (Pew 2009: 31) to 98 (Pryor 2007: 1817) to 99 per cent (CIA 2016o). It was not included in the Pew research (2012, 2013) research.

41. Tajikistan
According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Tajikistan is a hard-line autocracy. According to Freedom House (2016), it is a consolidated authoritarian regime. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the state is partly secular: religious dogmas have considerable influence on the legal system or political institutions.

A yearly religious donation (zakat) is paid by 66 per cent (Pew 2012:52), 27 per cent would support the application of saria as the official law (Pew 2013: 15), 33 per cent would support the jurisdiction of Islamic courts in family law (Pew 2013: 19). 20 per cent prefer a strong leader vs. 76 per cent prefer democracy (Pew 2013: 60). The political influence of religious leaders is supported by 28 per cent (Pew 2013: 64). Three per cent find suicide bombing sometimes or often justifiable (Pew 2013: 70).
There was a civil war in Tajikistan between 1992-1997. Since 1994 Emomali Rahmon (or Rahmanov) has been in power (Hiro 2009: 325-345). In 2016 he was granted indefinite time in power in a referendum (Guardian 2016a).

In 2002 the country was in included in a NATO partnership programme. Since 2012 there have been Islamist disturbances in the eastern region. The state uses the criminal law and administrative tools to crack down on both the Islamists and the opposition: beyond banning Islamist parties and life-time prison sentences for its leaders (Guardian 2016b), in a centrally organised action 13,000 men were forcibly shaved and shops selling hijabs were closed (Lewis 2016), while Arabic names to give to the newborn was also forbidden (Trilling 2015).

42. Turkmenistan
According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Turkmenistan is a hard-line autocracy. According to Freedom House (2016), it is a consolidated authoritarian regime. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the influence of Islam on the legal system and political institutions is strong, forming a hybrid system. As opposed to that, Recknagel & Tahir (2013) claim that the state selectively persecutes Islam.

The proportion of Muslims is 85 (CIA 2016q) to 87 (Pryor 2007: 1817) to 93 per cent (Pew 2009: 29). 73 per cent pay a yearly religious donation (Pew 2012:52) – other data presented in other countries above are not listed by Pew (2013).

Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, in power since 2007 and enjoying a personality cult, had the constitution modified in 2016 to remain in power for life (Guardian 2016c).

44. Uzbekistan
According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Uzbekistan is a hard-line autocracy. According to Freedom House (2016), it is a consolidated authoritarian regime. According to Bertelsmann (2016c), the state is largely secular but religious dogmas have considerable influence on the legal order and the political institutions.

The proportion of Muslims is between 76 and 96 per cent: 76 (Pryor 2007: 1817), 88 (CIA 2016r), 93 (Krausen 2015) and 96 per cent (Pew 2009: 29). Uzbekistan is present in the Pew research but not in the above quoted reports (2012, 2013).

Although Uzbekistan is one of the countries violating human rights the most (cf. the Andijan massacre, 2005), in 2015 John Kerry met with Islam Karimov (Guardian 2015). Karimov was in power for 25 years, and died in September 2016. According to Krausen (2015) the state strictly controls Muslim religious practice: those not worshipping in state-sanctioned mosques are deemed extremists and are subject to persecution. As discontent is growing, some would introduce a Muslim theocracy, but the majority would not wish fundamentalism to spread.

46. Yemen
According to Bertelsmann (2016a), Yemen is a hard-line autocracy. According to Bertelsmann (2016c) the state is secular, and religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on the legal order or the political institutions. Let me disagree on this latter point: a country suffering from a civil war partly induced by religious causes cannot be free of religious dogmas influencing the political situation.


Yemen has a Sunnite majority and Shia minority. The civil war has been fought between the Houthi rebels (Shia) and supporters of the earlier president, Hadi, since 2014 (BBC 2015). Conflicts started in 2011, fights broke out in 2014. At that point Houthis took the capital, Sanaa, and took control of the northwest part of the country (World Bank 2016). Hadi and his supporters are in power in the southern and eastern region, including, Aden, the large port city,
while the middle region is controlled by Al-Qaeda. Houthis and their ally, previous president Saleh, are probably supported by Iran (Shia), while the Hadi group is supported by Saudi Arabia (Sunnites). Saudi Arabia launched air strikes on Houthis in 2015, which started a full-blown war (Amnesty 2015). In the spring 2016 negotiations started, under international pressure, but fighting does not seem to cease (Fahim 2016). A ceasefire is advocated by international diplomacy (UN, USA) for fear the collapse favours Al-Qaeda being organised and armed there. According to the World Bank (2016), the conflict escalating since March 2015 has brought the total collapse of economic activity and a wide-range destruction of infrastructure in Yemen.

References


